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Safety & Alignment

Safety-Limited Training

also called Capability-limited training, Defensive-only training data

Deliberately leaving dangerous know-how out of the training data so the model cannot learn it.

Definition

A training policy that restricts what a model is taught in a risky domain — keeping defensive material, such as finding and fixing vulnerabilities, while filtering out offensive material, such as writing exploits — so the finished model is less useful for misuse even if its weights leak or it is jailbroken.

Tencent applied it to Hy4, released November 4, 2026: cybersecurity training was limited to defensive uses, and the company says its Xuanwu Lab and Keen Security Lab found no increased risk on cryptanalysis, reverse engineering or vulnerability exploitation, and no meaningful help with harmful biology experiments. But the check was internal, and Tencent’s own materials disagree on the boundary: the announcement says reverse engineering and penetration testing for analytical purposes were included, while the development team’s explanation says they were excluded.

The limit is a property of the weights, not a policy layered on top. A refusal can be removed by fine-tuning; knowledge that was never trained in is harder to recover. That is also its weakness: the line between defensive and offensive knowledge is genuinely blurry — a proof of concept that demonstrates a flaw is one edit from an exploit — so the boundary has to be argued case by case, and two documents from the same lab can draw it differently.

The Hy4 case shows why the boundary is hard to pin down even for the lab drawing it. The announcement and the development team’s explanation were both published November 4 and disagree on whether reverse engineering and penetration testing were in the training data; the announcement says they were included for analytical purposes, the explanation says they were excluded. Until the promised system card appears, the only public statement of the policy is the two documents disagreeing with each other.

Weights are the other half of the story. Hy4 is presented as an open-weight model, but as of the November 4 release only the August preview weights are downloadable under Apache 2.0; the final weights and the system card are promised "in the coming days". A safety limit in training data you cannot download is a claim about a hosted API, not a property you can verify.

How people use it
Deciding whether a model is safe to open-weight.
"Refusals will not survive a fine-tune. If we want this downloadable, the dangerous part has to be absent from the training data, not just refused at the output."
Worked example

The audit you cannot rerun

A vendor says its model was safety-limited in training and its own labs found no increased risk.

Ask for the system card: what was excluded, how the exclusion was checked, and the scores. Tencent’s audit conclusion arrived as a single sentence with no figures, from two labs owned by the same company. Without the card, there is nothing to reproduce and no number to set beside another lab’s — which is exactly the gap the Xenospectrum analysis flags.

Avoid

Treating it as a guarantee. Internal red-teaming without published scores is a claim, not evidence, and a model that never learned exploit-writing can still be combined with other tools that did.

Sources
Related terms